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1.  Introduction 
 
Scalar implicature is the phenomenon whereby the use of a weak or less informative term is 
intended to mean that a stronger or more informative term is not true. For instance, if uttered in 
response to a question "Did John eat all of the cookies?", sentence (1a) will generally be 
understood to mean (1b). 
 
(1) a. John ate some of the cookies. 
 b. =John did not eat all of the cookies. 
 
In this example, some is usually interpreted as meaning not all. Not all is not part of its 
lexical meaning, however, as illustrated by the fact that the not all meaning of some is defeasible 
(can be cancelled without resulting in an illogical statement, as in (2a)), whereas the core 
meaning is not (2b). 
 
(2) a. John ate some of the cookies. In fact, he ate all of them. 
 b. John ate some of the cookies. #In fact, he ate none of them. 
 
Thus, the not all meaning must be added to the interpretation through a pragmatic enrichment 
process. In traditional Gricean theories of pragmatics (e.g. Horn, 1972), the interpretation of 
SOME as NOT ALL arises as follows.
1
 SOME and ALL are both members of a lexical scale of 
quantifiers ordered from weakest to strongest, e.g. ⟨SOME, MOST, ALL⟩.2 In this scale, SOME is 
the weakest, or least informative, term. ALL is the strongest, or most informative, because it 
entails each of the other members of the scale. Assuming that a speaker is communicating 
cooperatively (Grice, 1975), she will use the most informative term she can. Thus, if a speaker 
utters SOME, she must have been unable to utter ALL, and therefore the hearer infers that all was 
not true.  
The investigation of how, when, and under what circumstances the scalar inference (the 
interpretation of SOME as meaning NOT ALL) arises during online processing constitutes a 
major area of inquiry in experimental pragmatics, and has been addressed using a wide variety of 
                                                        
1
 I use capitals to represent the terms some, not all, etc., as well as their equivalents in other languages. For 
simplicities' sake I also use these capital terms as shorthand to refer to alternative morphological forms of the same 
quantifier (e.g., English bare some and partitive some of). See Degen and Tanenhaus (2011) and Grodner et al. 
(2010), inter alia, for discussion of the influence of the morphological form of the English quantifier on scalar 
implicature realization; see Tsai (2004) for discussion of interpretations of different morphological realizations of 
SOME in Mandarin Chinese, the language used in the present study. 
2
 It is assumed that many other classes of words fall onto lexical scales like this, e.g. ⟨cool, cold⟩, ⟨like, love⟩ 
(Rullman & You, 2006; Hirschberg, 1991). The scales most commonly investigated in experimental pragmatics are 
the quantifier scale ⟨SOME, ALL⟩ and the coordinator scale ⟨OR, AND⟩. In this study I only address the quantifier 
scale.  
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methods (speeded verification: Bott & Noveck, 2004; Bott et al., 2011; Noveck & Posada, 2003; 
Feeney et al., 2004; reading times: Breheny et al., 2006; Lewis & Phillips, 2011; Hartshorne & 
Snedeker, in press; visual world: Huang & Snedeker, 2009; Panizza et al., 2009; Grodner et al., 
2009; Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011; event-related potentials: Noveck & Posada, 2003; Nieuwland 
et al., 2010; Politzer-Ahles et al., in press; Hunt et al., in press). These studies have reached 
different conclusions about whether the NOT ALL meaning of SOME is generated rapidly or at a 
delay, and whether or not it guides readers' predictions about upcoming lexical items as the rest 
of the sentence unfolds. 
To the best of my knowledge, however, such investigations have focused exclusively on the 
processing of the NOT ALL meaning of SOME. According to the Gricean view of scalar 
implicature, however, a more articulated pragmatic interpretation of SOME should be available. 
The rationale for this is as follows. A speaker choosing to utter SOME has not only chosen not to 
utter ALL, but also spurned other alternatives such as MOST and MANY. While the semantics and 
pragmatics of MANY are relatively complicated, MOST is clearly a more informative term than 
SOME, as it entails SOME and gives more specific information about the quantity of entities 
being referred to.
3
 For example, (3a) only tells the hearer that John ate at least one cookie, 
whereas (3b) tells the hearer both that John ate at least one cookie and that the quantity of 
cookies he ate is more than half the total available set of cookies. 
 
(3) a. John ate some of the cookies. 
 b. John ate most of the cookies. 
 
Under this interpretation, then, just as SOME can imply NOT ALL, it should also imply not 
most. This aspect of the interpretation of SOME was pointed out as early as De Morgan 
(1847:58, cited in Papafragou & Schwarz, 2005:217), who noted that "Some usually means a 
rather small fraction of the whole; a larger fraction would be expressed by a good many; and 
somewhat more than half by most." It is also formulated in neo-Gricean terms by Levinson 
(1983:133), whose definition of linguistic scales details that use of a weaker term on the scale 
implies negation of all stronger terms, not just negation of the endpoint: 
 
Given any scale of the form ⟨e1, e2, e3, … en⟩, if a speaker asserts A(e2), then he 
implicates ~A(e1), if he asserts A(e3), then he implicates ~A(e2) and ~A(e1), and 
in general, if he asserts A(en), then he implicates ~(A(en-1)), ~(A(en-2)) and so on, 
up to ~(A(e1)) 
 
Consider, for instance, (5a)—uttered in response to (4)—the interpretation of which is (5b) 
rather than (5c): 
 
(4) Did John eat most of the cookies? 
                                                        
3
 There is debate regarding whether the meaning of MOST is composed or atomic, what the appropriate semantic 
representation of its meaning is (Hackl, 2009; Pietroski et al., 2009). More crucially for the purposes of the present 
work, there has also been disagreement over whether MOST is semantically or pragmatically upper-bounded 
(Papafragou & Schwarz, 2006; Horn, 2006; Ariel, 2004), although there is evidence in favor of the later, and several 
recent treatments of scalar implicature assume that SOME and MOST are on the same lexical scale (Doran et al., 
2009; Katsos & Cummins, 2010; Doran et al., 2012). As the focus of the present study is on the nature of the scale 
used when interpreting SOME, rather than on the specification of the meaning of MOST, the reader is referred to the 
works cited above for further discussion. 




(5) a. John ate some of the cookies. 
 b. John did not eat most of the cookies; he only ate some of them. 
 c. John ate some, and in fact did eat most, of the cookies. 
 
Additional support for the notion that the most part of the scale matters for the interpretation 
of SOME is that SOME sounds more felicitous for describing a subset of entities that makes up 
less than half the set, rather than a subset that makes up more than half the set. In other words, 
sentence (6) sounds more acceptable if four or five out of twenty students in the class are female, 
and less acceptable if eighteen or nineteen out of twenty students in the class are female. 
 
(6) Some of the students in the class are female. 
 
Degen and Tanenhaus (2011) found that, when given a display in which a gumball machine held 
13 gumballs and some number of gumballs then came out, participants were most accepting of 
the sentence "You got some of the gumballs" when the number of gumballs that actually came 
out was 5 (just under half). They became progressively less accepting of the sentence, and slower 
to respond, when some was used to refer to higher numbers of gumballs.
4
 Thus, there seems to be 
both introspective and empirical basis for hypothesizing that SOME preferentially describes 
subsets that do not make up a majority of the set—in other words, that SOME might mean NOT 
MOST. Nevertheless, introspective evidence for pragmatic phenomena is not always reliable; in 
the present case, for example, speakers questioned directly about their intuitions about SOME 
varied considerably in whether or not they said they were willing to accept SOME to refer to a 
majority, leaving open the possibility that levels of the ⟨ALL, MOST, SOME⟩ scale other than 
ALL may be less salient, speakers may be implicitly but not explicitly sensitive to pragmatic 
bounds imposed by these intermediate levels. Thus, it is valuable to investigate this issue using 
an implicit rather than explicit measure, in a design that allows for  
The current study investigates the nature of the scale used in the evaluation of SOME, 
specifically, whether SOME is interpreted not only as the negation of the endpoint of the scale 
(ALL) but also as the negation of intermediate levels like MOST. To investigate this, I used a 
speeded version of the picture-sentence verification paradigm (Wu & Tan, 2009; Tavano, 2010), 
contrasting participants' response times to SOME sentences when the entity quantified by SOME 
refers to a subset of entities that makes up the majority, minority, or precisely half of the set of 
entities in a preceding picture. Mandarin Chinese speakers viewed pictures that included groups 
of people doing different things (e.g., several people eating hot dogs and several people eating 
cake), and then read sentences such as the Chinese equivalent of "In the picture, some of the 
people are eating hot dogs". Their task was to judge whether the sentence was consistent with the 
picture, and to make this judgment as quickly as possible after seeing the critical word (the 
object that corresponded to either the majority, minority, or precisely half of the entities in the 
picture). The hypothesis tested was that the interpretation of SOME as meaning NOT MOST 
would cause response times to be faster in a context where less than half of the people in the 
picture are eating hot dogs than in a context where more than half the people are (for example). 
Such a difference could be due to predictive processing—the lower-bounded interpretation of 
                                                        
4
 Participants were also less accepting and slower on sentences when some was used to a number of gumballs less 
than four; this was because numbers were also used in the experiment and participants preferred to use numbers to 
refer to sets of gumballs that were easily countable—i.e., sets that were in the subitizing range. 
Kansas Working Papers in Linguistics, Vol. 33 (2012), 1-15 
4 
 
SOME may lead participants to expect the word corresponding to the minority of objects and 
thus be slower to recognize the word corresponding to the majority—or due to verification 
times—participants may be faster to verify sentences that they consider more consistent with the 




2.  Methods 
 
2.1.  Participants 
 
Data were collected from 38 native speakers of Mandarin (17 female, age range 18-42, mean 
22.3) from mainland China who were members of the University of Kansas community. An 
additional three participants were excluded from the analysis because their accuracy was below 
70% or their mean response times were more than three standard deviations above the mean 
response time for the entire set of participants. Many of the participants were bilingual in 
Standard Mandarin and a local language or dialect, but all participants reported that Standard 
Mandarin was the language they acquired earliest and the one they use most. All had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. All participants provided their informed consent to participate in the 
study and received payment, and all methods were approved by the Human Subjects Committee 
of Lawrence at the University of Kansas. 
 
2.2.  Materials and design 
 
Forty-eight sentences and matching pictures were created to serve as the critical stimuli; they 
were adapted from Politzer-Ahles et al. (in press: Experiment 2), and the sentences were 
modified where necessary such that each followed the form "图片里 (In the picture), / 有的 
(some of the) / <subjects> / <verb> / <object>" (slashes indicate how the sentences were divided 
into regions). The sentences were in Mandarin Chinese. The quantifier used in all critical 
sentences was 有的 (yǒu -de), the interpretation of which is roughly equivalent to English 
partitive some of (Xie, 2003; Tsai, 2004).
6
 Four pictures were made to complement each 
sentence (see Figure 1). 
Each picture was a "some"-type array (i.e., included actors that were doing different things 
and could thus be described using a SOME sentence, as opposed to a picture made up of actors 
that were all doing the same thing and would be described using an ALL sentence) and included 
six actors or items. In the picture array corresponding to the High condition, four of the actors 
(the majority) are interacting with the object that is ultimately mentioned in the sentence, and 
two are interacting with some other object. In the Mid picture array, three of the actors pictured 
are interacting with that object and three with another object; in the Low picture array two are 
                                                        
5
 Note that since the pictures included in the present study included no more than two subsets of objects, the 
predictions are identical whether MOST is represented as meaning "more than half" (a majority) or as "the largest 
subset" (a plurality). 
6
 Although MOST was not explicitly included in any sentences in the experiment, it may still be relevant for 
participants' interpretation of SOME, as described in the Introduction. Mandarin Chinese has two common classifiers 
that correspond to English most of: 大部分的 (dà bùfen –de, "the big part of") and 大多数 (dà duō shù, "the big 
number of"). Like English most of, both of these can felicitously refer to pluralities and majorities, and both have 
defeasible upper bounds ("most… in fact, all"). Both have counterparts that refer to minorities: 少部分的 (shǎo 
bùfen -de "the small part of") and 少数 (shǎo shù "the small number of"). 
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interacting with that object and four with another. In the Mismatch picture array, different 
proportions of actors are interacting with different objects (four-two, three-three, or two-four; 16 
of each type, randomly distributed across the different sets), but none of the objects are those that 
are mentioned in the sentence. The reason for including six actors in each picture array was to 
ensure that the picture array in the Low condition would have at least two of the low-occurring 
item (because SOME might also imply more than one, picture arrays in which the low-occurring 
item only appears once were not used) and that the difference in number between low- and high-
occurring items would be salient (in a picture array with five actors/items, the difference between 
two items and three items may be difficult to notice). In all conditions, the critical objects used in 
the pictures arrays (those that would be mentioned in sentences) were highly recognizable, being 
chosen as completions for comparable sentence frames by at least 86% of participants in a 
previously-conducted sentence completion test (Politzer-Ahles et al., in press: Experiment 2), 
and the words corresponding to those objects were always two characters in length. In this way I 
created three conditions with matching objects that represent the majority, minority, or half of 
the objects in the picture, and one condition with entirely mismatching objects; the sentences 




Figure 1:  A sample set of picture arrays to go with the sentence 
有的人在吃热狗 ("Some of the people are eating hot dogs.") The labels in the 
upper-left corner of each array indicate what condition each picture belonged to, 
and were included in the stimuli presented during the experiment. On a given trial 
only one of these four pictures would be presented. 
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The 48 experimental items were interspersed with 96 fillers of the following types: 12 
"some"-type and 12 "all"-type picture arrays paired with sentences in which the verb did not 
match the activity described in the picture; 12 "all"-type picture arrays paired with sentences in 
which the object did not match the object shown in the picture array; 12 "all"-type picture arrayss 
paired with sentences in which the quantifier "some" did not match the number of items in the 
picture array (underinformative sentences; see Politzer-Ahles et al., in press; Hunt et al., 2011; 
Tavano, 2010; Nieuwland et al., 2010; Wu & Tan, 2009; Noveck & Posada, 2003); 12 "some"-
type picture arrays paired with sentences with the quantifier "all", which is patently incorrect for 
describing these pictures (logic violations; see Politzer-Ahles et al., in press; Tavano, 2010; Wu 
& Tan, 2009); and 36 "all"-type picture arrays paired with sentences that correctly matched the 
picture. Overall the number of "some"- and "all"-type picture arrays and sentences was equal and 
the different picture and quantifier types were each followed by incorrect sentences 50% of the 
time (underinformative sentences were counted as incorrect). 
The 48 experimental items were organized into four experimental lists following a Latin 
square design, such that each list had 12 items from each condition, no items were repeated 
within a list, and each item appeared exactly once in each condition and once in each list. The 
same 96 fillers were included in all four lists. The lists were divided into three blocks such that 
each block contained 4 items from each condition (or 12 items from the filler condition with 
sentences that correctly match "all"-type pictures). Each of the three blocks of the four lists was 
pseudorandomized according to the following constraints: no more than three items from the 
same condition occurred consecutively; no more than three correct or incorrect items occurred 
consecutively; no more than four "some"- or "all"-type pictures occurred consecutively; and no 
more than five "some"- or "all"-type sentences occurred consecutively. The four lists were 
pseudorandomized together, such that a given item appeared in the same order (although in 
different conditions) on each list. 
 
2.3.  Procedure 
 
Participants were seated comfortably in a dimly-lit room, in front of a CRT monitor. The pictures 
and sentences were presented at the center of the screen using the Presentation software package 
(Neurobehavioral Systems, http://www.neurobs.com). Each trial began with a picture array 
presented in the center of the screen (at 768x576 pixels on a 1024x768px screen) for 7000 ms to 
ensure that subjects had time to carefully inspect the picture and fully process the relative 
proportions of different objects. After the picture array disappeared, it was immediately followed 
by a fixation point of random duration of up to 2000 ms, after which the presentation of the 
sentence began immediately. Sentences were presented at the center of the screen in 30pt 
SimSun font using the serial visual presentation procedure, with a stimulus onset asynchrony of 
800 ms (words presented for 400 ms each, followed by a blank screen for 400 ms), which has 
been found to be natural and comfortable for Chinese readers in recent event-related potential 
studies (e.g. Li & Zhou, 2010).  The final word of each sentence, the object, was presented 
simultaneously with the judgment prompts 一致 and 不一致 ("consistent" and "inconsistent") in 
the lower left- and right-hand parts of the screen, and participants were instructed to respond to 
the prompts as quickly as possible once the object word appeared. The participants' task was to 
judge whether or not the sentence just presented was consistent with the picture array. Because 
the fillers included underinformative sentences, which can be interpreted as consistent or as 
inconsistent with the context (Noveck & Posada, 2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004; Tavano, 2010), 
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participants were given explicit instructions before the experiment began that what the 
experimenters were interested in was the participants' own linguistic intuitions and that for some 
trials there would be no right or wrong answer but that they should simply respond as quickly as 
possible with the first judgment that came to their mind. Participants submitted their responses 
with their right index and middle fingers using a gamepad, and the buttons used for "consistent" 
and "inconsistent" responses (as well as the corresponding screen locations of the judgment 
prompts) were counterbalanced across participants. The trial ended with the participant's 
response, and the screen remained blank for 2500 ms, after which time the next trial began. 
Participants were given five breaks during the experiment (once every 24 trials). 
 Participants completed a brief practice session of 10 trials before the main experiment. 
The practice session consisted of items similar in structure to the sentences used in the main 
experiment, and included violations at the quantifier, subject, verb, and object positions. The 
entire experiment, including practice and breaks, took about 45 minutes. 
 
2.4.  Data analysis 
 
Incorrect responses were removed from the analysis, as were responses faster than 200 ms or 
slower than 6000 ms (based on Bott & Noveck, 2004).
7
 Response times were logarithmically 
transformed, and average response time for each of the critical conditions (High, Mid, Low, and 
Mismatch) was computed for each participant based on the remaining data.
8
 These times were 
submitted to a one-way repeated measures ANOVA, with degrees of freedom adjusted using the 
Huynh-Feldt procedure for comparisons with more than one degree of freedom in the numerator. 
Additionally, the proportion of times a given participant responded "consistent" to the 
underinformative sentences (i.e., the proportion of logical responses) was calculated. 
 
3.  Results 
 
3.1.  Accuracy and proportion of pragmatic responses 
 
On average, participants accepted 90% of High trials, 89.3% of Mid trials, 86.4% of Low trials, 
and 27.2% of Mismatch trials. After coding "consistent" responses as correct for High, Mid, and 
Low, and "inconsistent" as correct for Mismatch, a repeated measures ANOVA confirmed that 
accuracy differed across conditions, F(1.93, 71.30) = 15.06, p < .001). Bonferroni-corrected 
post-hoc t-tests showed that accuracy was lower on Mismatch trials than on all other conditions 
(all ps > .001) and none of the other conditions differed in accuracy (all p = 1). 
Trials in which an "all"-type picture is followed by a sentence using SOME (for instance, a 
picture of six boys who are all eating hot dogs, followed by a sentence "Some of the boys are 
eating hot dogs"—in other words, underinformative trials) can be interpreted as either consistent 
                                                        
7
 In addition to these trimming criteria I also repeated the analysis using several other sets of criteria, including 0-
3000 ms (Noveck & Posada, 2003), 200-3500 ms (based on the standard deviation of the current dataset), subject-
specific criteria based on each subject's mean and standard deviation or inter-quartile range, and no trimming. As the 
pattern of results did not differ across trimming methods, only one is reported here. 
8
 I also calculated means using residual reaction times (predicted reaction times for each subject were calculated 
using the number of characters, total number of strokes, and average strokes per character of the corresponding 
trial's sentence-final object). Both dependent measures were trimmed using the criteria that were applied to the raw 
reaction time analysis. Since the pattern of data did not differ across dependent measures, I only report the log 
reaction time analysis here. 
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or inconsistent with the context (both responses were counted as correct). A response of 
"inconsistent" is a pragmatic response, because the participant is evaluating the sentence based 
on the pragmatic interpretation of SOME, which is NOT ALL. A response of "consistent" is a 
logical response, because the participant is using the logical interpretation, at least one. A similar 
possibility exists for High trials: if participants interpret SOME as meaning NOT MOST, the 
sentence would be inconsistent with the picture. Nonetheless, the rate of logical response to 
underinformative trials, like High trials, was very high, 86% across participants. Unlike several 
previous studies that reported wide variation in participants' responses to underinformative 
sentence and a bimodal distribution between pragmatic and logical responders (e.g. Hunt et al., 
2011; Noveck & Posada, 2003), in the present study acceptance rates to High, Mid, Low, and 
underinformative sentences all followed negatively-skewed unimodal distributions with high 
means, minima near 50%, and standard deviations near 10%, indicating that almost all 
participants were logical responders and that the distribution of responses to underinformative 
sentences was similar to that of responses to the critical sentences. Participants' acceptance rate 
for underinformative sentences was not significantly correlated with their acceptance rates for 
any other sentence types (ps > .1). 
 
3.2.  Reaction times 
 
The comparisons of relevance to the hypotheses described in the Introduction are those between 
the High, Mid, and Low conditions. Comparisons between the Mismatch condition and the other 
conditions involve comparing across different responses (Mismatch elicits a response of 
"inconsistent" and the other conditions generally elicited responses of "consistent"). 
Nevertheless, in order to make a comparison between potential quantity-based and lexically-
based effects, all four conditions were included in the statistical analysis.  
The mean response times for each condition are shown in Figure 2. There difference between 
conditions was significant (F1(3,111) = 30.24, p < .001; F2(3,138) = 31.41, p < .001). However, 
the significant effect in the omnibus ANOVA was due to the Mismatch condition, which was 
responded to significantly more slowly than any other condition (all p1s < .001; all p2s < .001); 
none of the comparisons between High, Mid, and Low approached significance (all p1s > .444; 
all p2s > .681). 





Figure 2. Mean response time for each condition. 
 
 In order to better account for potential subject-related and item-related variation in 
reaction times, the data were additionally analyzed using a linear mixed effects model (Baayen et 
al., 2008) including condition as a fixed effect and subjects and items as random effects. The 
results of the linear mixed effects model are shown in Table 2 (with the Low condition used as 
the baseline). Once again, while there was a trend towards Low having faster reaction times than 
High or Mid, the differences were not significant; only the Mismatch condition significantly 
differed from the others. 
 
 Coefficient (log RT) Standard error t p  
Intercept 6.97 0.06   
High 0.05 0.03 1.53 .120 
Mid 0.05 0.03 1.57 .130 
Mismatch 0.40 0.05 7.31 <.001 *** 
 
Table 1. Fixed-effect coefficients from the linear mixed effects model. p-values 
are estimated from a two-tailed t distribution with df=1522.  
 
4.  Discussion 
 
4.1. Reaction times 
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The present study assumed that, if all levels of a lexical scale were used to guide processing, 
SOME would be interpreted online as meaning not most as well as NOT ALL, participants 
reading SOME sentences would thus expect the sentence to refer to an element that makes up 
half or less than half of a set, and subsequently they would be faster to verify sentences making 
reference to that element compared to sentences that are correct but make reference to a less 
expected element (the element that makes up the majority of objects). However, contrary to 
predictions, the present study found no evidence that participants were faster to verify sentences 
of either of the three conditions: while objects that did not match any object in the picture were 
responded to more slowly than objects that did, there were no differences in reaction time 
depending on the relative quantity of the objects in the picture. 
On the surface, this finding seems contradictory to the results of Degen & Tanenhaus (2011), 
who demonstrated that the size of a subset influences the acceptability of and response times to 
sentences including some. It is necessary, however, to consider other reasons why response time 
differences may not have been observed in the present study. Alternative explanations for the 
null result include the absence of lexical alternatives in the materials, the task used, the salience 
of the difference between High and Low, and participant response strategies. These explanations 
are discussed below. 
In the present study, the only quantifiers used in the experiment proper were 有的 ("some 
of") and 所有的 ("all of"). Previous empirical evidence, however, has shown that the presence of 
additional lexical alternatives (for example, numbers or other quantifiers) in the experimental 
context has an influence on how SOME is processed (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011). For instance, 
Huang and Snedeker (2009), using a visual world paradigm with numbers included in the fillers, 
found that the pragmatic meaning of some did not rapidly influence eye movements, whereas 
Grodner and colleagues (2010), using a similar paradigm but without numbers in the fillers (and 
with several other methodological changes) found that it did. Huang and colleagues (2010) 
manipulated the presence or absence of lexical alternatives within a single experiment and found 
evidence that the pragmatic meaning of some was computed earlier when numbers were not 
included in the fillers (but not as early as in Grodner et al., 2010). Degen and Tanenhaus (2011) 
have interpreted these results as demonstrating that some is dispreferred when a more natural 
alternative (such as a number) is available in the experimental context. This may mean that 
SOME is only interpreted to mean the negation of another element in a scale if that element of 
the scale is an expected lexical alternative in the context—in other words, SOME can only be 
interpreted as NOT ALL if ALL was also available in the context, and likewise SOME can only be 
interpreted as NOT MOST if MOST was also available in the context. Support for this notion 
comes from both introspective and empirical data regarding boundedness (Breheny et al., 2006; 
Katsos & Cummins, 2010). Such data have shown that SOME is more likely to be interpreted as 
NOT ALL when uttered as a response to a question where ALL would have been a relevant 
response (an upper-bound context), as in (7), than to a sentence where ALL would not have been 
relevant (a lower-bound context), as in (8); examples are from Katsos & Cummins (2010). 
 
7) a. Were all of their identity documents forgeries? 
 b. Some of their identity documents were forgeries. 
 
8) a. Is there any evidence against them? 
 b. Some of their identity documents were forgeries. 
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Thus, if the NOT MOST interpretation of SOME is only available when MOST is a salient lexical 
alternative in the context, it would not have been available to guide processing in the present 
experiment. Including MOST in the fillers in a study like this may make this interpretation more 
salient. 
Another possible reason for the null result is that the task may have been insensitive 
predictive processing. As described in the introduction, it is possible that the time taken to verify 
SOME does not differ depending on whether it refers to the minority or majority of objects, but 
that the interpretation of SOME as meaning NOT MOST could cause participants to make a 
forward expectation towards one of the objects illustrated and thus take longer to recognize the 
word corresponding to the other object. Differences in how strongly predicted a word is during 
reading are typically tested using reading times (in either self-paced reading or eye movements), 
electrophysiological activity (i.e., the N400 component in event-related potential research), or 
cross-modal priming. The present study, on the other hand, used a speeded verification task with 
verification responses time-locked to the presentation of the critical word. This task indeed 
showed a difference between response times to words that lexically matched the picture and 
words that did not, but this task may not be as sensitive as the other tasks described above to the 
subtler manipulation of pragmatic consistency. Since participants had a limited set of words they 
could predict (two entities in the picture that could be referred to), it is likely that they were able 
to predict both to some extent (see Hunt et al., 2011, for discussion of split predictions in SOME 
sentences), and the present task may not have been sensitive enough to identify subtle 
differences between the strengths of the two predictions. Furthermore, verification times reflect 
both the time needed to recognize the meaning of a word and the time taken to verify the 
sentence (Huang & Snedeker; but see Bott et al., 2011, for discussion of how to separate these). 
It remains an open question, then, whether the present study's predictions may be borne out if a 
different task is used. 
The present study contrasted sets in which the entity referred to in the sentence constituted a 
High number of the entities in the picture (four out of six) versus sets in which the entity 
constituted a Mid (three out of six) or Low (two out of six) number of entities. Across the High, 
Low, and Mid conditions, the number of elements referred to always fell within the subitizing 
range (Degen & Tanenhaus, 2011). It is possible that the differences between these conditions 
were not large or salient enough to cause participants to make differential predictions. 
Differences in prediction strength may have been larger if the sets shown in the study were 
larger. The Gricean account outlined in the Introduction, however, does not predict the overall 
set size to matter (it only predicts differences between set sizes that correspond to different levels 
of a scale—such as majority, half, and minority—, not differences based on the size or salience 
of the difference between minority and majority). Thus, a finding of response time differences in 
a study with a larger difference between set sizes and not in the present study, such a result 
would be unpredicted by this account, and may call for a refinement of it. 
Finally, another possible explanation for the null result is that participants were not paying 
close attention to quantification but rather were performing lexical matching between the 
sentential objects and the pictures. Indeed, they were far more likely to accept underinformative 
sentences than the participants in Politzer-Ahles et al. (in press; but see Politzer-Ahles, 2011, for 
a review of the variation of acceptance rates across studies and the factors that contribute to this 
variation). To test this possibility, I performed an exploratory analysis (using pairwise t-tests) of 
participants' accuracy in fillers which had erroneous verbs or which incorrectly used ALL when 
the quantifier SOME should have been used; if participants were only matching the objects to the 
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pictures, they would have failed to reject these types of sentences. Participants performed with 
85.7% accuracy on the sentences with verb errors and 94.1% accuracy on the sentences with 
logical quantifier errors. (Recall that in the critical sentences, participants' accuracy was 90.1%, 
89.7%, 87.7%, and 74.6% on High, Mid, Low, and Mismatch trials, respectively.) Accuracy on 
the sentences with quantifier errors was higher than accuracy on Mismatch (p < .001) and Low 
(p = .005), and marginally higher than on Mid (p = .058); accuracy on sentences with verb errors 
was higher than accuracy on Mismatch (p < .001) and marginally lower than accuracy on High 
(p = .085). In all, it does not seem to be the case that participants performed systematically worse 
in these fillers than they did on the critical trials, and in fact they were much worse at detecting 
semantic errors in the object position than at other positions in the sentence. This suggests that 
they were not merely using a lexical matching strategy in the experiment. 
 
4.2. Acceptance rates 
 
Participants' judgments also did not provide evidence for greater acceptance of SOME when 
referring to items that formed the minority, rather than the majority or precisely half, of a set. 
Rather, participants tended to accept items from all these conditions. Furthermore, there was no 
evidence for a split between responders who consistently accepted SOME referring to majorities 
and those who did not; rather, responders' acceptance rates formed a unimodal distribution, 
unlike the bimodal distributions observed in some studies on underinformative sentences 
(Noveck & Posada, 2003; Hunt et al., 2011). However, the same was true of the 
underinformative sentences included in the present study: there was not evidence for separate 
groups of semantic and pragmatic responders. 
 Picture-sentence sets similar to these were tested in Politzer-Ahles et al. (in press). When 
participants' task was to judge the sentences as consistent or inconsistent (Experiment 1), the 
majority of participants did not consistently choose one or the other, although several 
participants did consistently accept or reject such sentences. On the other hand, when 
participants' task was to rate the picture-sentence consistency on a gradient 7-point scale, two 
groups emerged, one of participants whose ratings showed sensitivity to the 
underinformativeness of the sentence (i.e., pragmatic responders) and one of participants whose 
ratings did not (i.e., semantic or inconsistent responders). The question, then, is why similar 
materials in the present study yielded mostly semantic responses. 
  There are suggestions in the literature that when participants are made to respond 
quickly, they are less likely to interpret SOME pragmatically (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Chevallier 
et al., 2008; Bott et al., 2011). Degen & Tanenhaus (2011, Experiment 2) also found high 
acceptance rates of underinformative English bare some (but not partitive some of) when 
participants were asked to respond as quickly as possible. Thus, it is possible that the nature of 
the task coerced most participants into behaving like semantic responders in the present study—
although it should be noted that in similar verification time studies in French (Noveck & Posada, 
2003; Bott & Noveck, 2004, Experiment 3) participants under time pressure still made more 
pragmatic responses than the present study (in terms of both overall response proportion and 
proportion of pragmatic responders) and exhibited grouping (in Noveck & Posada, 2003, most 
participants were highly consistent in their responses; Bott & Noveck, 2004, do not report 
response consistency for their participants, but acceptance rates to underinformative sentences do 
show a larger standard deviation than those to other sentence types, possibly indicative of 
aggregating across responders with different tendencies, and clearly different  than the present 
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study, in which acceptance rates for underinformative sentences followed roughly the same 
distribution as those to correct critical sentences). 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
The present paper presented a previously untested prediction made by accounts of pragmatic 
processing that assume Gricean maxims and lexical scales are used during online 
comprehension—the prediction that SOME will be interpreted online as meaning not most as 
well as NOT ALL, and will guide processing accordingly. I have also presented an experimental 
design through which this prediction can be tested. Although the data did not provide support for 
this prediction—and, if proven robust, these findings would call for an explanation of why 
certain levels of the scale hypothesized by Gricean accounts are not used during online 
comprehension—several alternative explanations need to be ruled out. Chief among these 
alternative factors is the presence or absence of lexical alternatives in the experimental context, 
and the task used; both of these are fruitful avenues for future research into this aspect of scalar 
implicature processing and are being examined in research that is currently underway.  
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